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We introduce the distribution of a secret multipartite entangled state in a real–world scenario as a quantum
primitive. We show that in the presence of noisy quantum channels (and noisy control operations) any state
chosen from the set of two–colorable graph states (CSS codewords) can be created with high fidelity while it
remains unknown to all parties. This is accomplished by either blind multipartite entanglement purification,
which we introduce in this paper, or by multipartite entanglement purification of enlarged states, which offers
advantages over an alternative scheme based on standard channel purification and teleportation. The parties are
thus provided with a secret resource of their choice for distributed secure applications.
PACS numbers: 03.67.-a, 03.67.Hk, 03.67.Mn, 03.67.Pp
I. INTRODUCTION
In classical information theory a number of basic primi-
tives are known —among them bit commitment, coin tossing,
fingerprinting, Byzantine agreement and key distribution—,
which serve as building blocks for practically relevant appli-
cations. Several of these classical primitives have also been
investigated in a quantum set–up. It was shown that quantum
features allow one to perform certain tasks apparently impos-
sible in a classical set–up, the most prominent example being
(quantum) key distribution, which allows for unconditional
secure communication. The quantum nature of states offers,
however, not only additional possibilities to realize classical
primitives, but also allows us to consider new primitives that
are intrinsically quantum and hence do not have a counterpart
in classical information theory or classical physics. An im-
portant aspect of such quantum primitives —which has been
mostly neglected in previous discussions— is the stability of
these concepts under imperfections, i.e. the realization of the
task in a real–world scenario. A task that might seem triv-
ial in an idealized scenario may become highly non–trivial or
even impossible under realistic conditions, i.e. when taking
inevitable noise in quantum channels and local control oper-
ations into account. We emphasize that noise is not just a
practical issue, but is a fundamental limitation one has to cope
with in quantum systems.
In this paper, we will discuss a robust quantum primitive,
which may be used as a basic building block for both quan-
tum and classical security applications in situations where lo-
cal and channel noise are present. Specifically, we will con-
sider the secret creation of a spatially distributed multipar-
tite entangled state with high fidelity. We will consider the
set of all two–colorable graph states as possible target states.
Two–colorable graph states include many qualitatively dif-
ferent types of multipartite entangled states, each of which
can serve as a different resource to perform certain security
tasks. In particular, they include any collection of bipartite
singlet states shared between some of the parties, any type
of multipartite GHZ states, so–called cluster states [1, 2] (a
universal resource for measurement based quantum compu-
tation) as well as algorithmic specific resources which allow
one to implement a certain algorithm (or non–local unitary
operation) by means of measurements. As has been shown
recently, two colorable graph states are equivalent to code-
words of Calderbank–Shor–Steane (CSS) codes [3]. It may
be of interest to the end–users that the state remains secret
to any third party, i.e. nobody else knows which specific re-
source they share (and hence which tasks they are capable to
perform). The information about the state can even remain
unknown to the parties themselves, being only disclosed to a
single end-user ( e.g. a trusted party or dealer). This is rele-
vant in the implementation of distributed secure quantum ap-
plications over noisy communication channels, which count
with an additional ‘adversary’, the eavesdropper (that should
be considered as the noise source in the channel), and that
might collaborate with the untrustful parties. There are stan-
dard purification protocols [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9] used to reduce
noise levels and factor out any possible eavesdropper even in
the presence of noise [10]. However, these protocols can not
straightforwardly be accommodated to account for possible
untrustful parties —which actively participate in the purifica-
tion protocol—, and for their possible complicity with eaves-
dropper.
In this paper, we present ways to achieve the secure dis-
tribution of the aforementioned graph states under realistic
conditions, i.e. noisy quantum channels and imperfect local
control operations. After fixing notation and describing the
scenario for secret state distribution in Sec. II, we present
three possible solutions to the problem in Sec. III. The first
approach, described in Sec. III A, is based on channel purifi-
cation and teleportation, while the second and third approach
deal with direct multipartite entanglement purification. The
second approach, described in Sec. III B, uses blind multi-
partite entanglement purification, which we introduce in this
paper. In the third approach (see Sec. III C), the security is
guaranteed by purifying an enlarged entangled state. We sum-
marize and conclude in Sec. IV.
2II. DEFINITIONS AND DESCRIPTION OF THE
SCENARIO
A. Two–colorable graph states
We start by defining two–colorable graph states. A graph
G, given by a set of N vertices {1, 2, . . . , N} connected in
a specific way by edges E, is called two–colorable if there
exists two groups of vertices,A,B such that there are no edges
inside either of the groups, i.e. {k, l} 6∈ E if k, l ∈ A or
k, l ∈ B (see Fig. 1). To every such graph there corresponds a
basis of N–qubit states {|µ〉G}, where each of the basis states
|µ〉G is the common eigenstate of N commuting correlation
operators KGj with eigenvalues (−1)µj , µ = µ1µ2 . . . µN .
That is, they fulfill the set of eigenvalue equationsKGj |µ〉G =
(−1)µj |µ〉G, j = 1, . . . , N . The correlation operators are
uniquely determined by the graph G and are given by
KGj = σ
(j)
α
∏
{k,j}∈E
σ(k)α , (1)
where α = x [α = z] if j ∈ A [j ∈ B] respectively and σ(k)α
denotes the application of the corresponding Pauli operator by
party k. Note that the so-defined graph states are identical to
the usual graph states, as introduced in [2] and e.g. used in
Ref. [8, 9], up to local Hadamard operations performed on
all particles in B. As has been shown recently [3] they are
in fact equivalent to codewords of the CSS codes. We also
remark that the correlation operators {Kj} are the generators
of a group which is often called stabilizer of the state |0〉G,
and the corresponding description in terms of the stabilizers is
also referred to as the stabilizer formalism.
We will also consider mixed states ρ, which for a given
graph G can be written in the corresponding graph state basis
{|µ〉G}, ρ =
∑
µ,ν λµν |µ〉〈ν|. We will often be interested in
fidelity of the mixed state, i.e. the overlap with some desired
pure state, say |0〉G, F = 〈0|ρ|0〉.
(a) (b)
(c)
FIG. 1: Examples of two–colorable graphs which correspond to (a)
GHZ state; (b) linear cluster state; (c) two–dimensional cluster state.
Vertices with same color are not connected by edges.
B. Description of scenario
We consider a central partyC (the company), which is con-
nected via noisy quantum channels to N spatially separated
local agents Aj , j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}. The company offers the
service to spatially separated customers to deliver upon re-
quest any multipartite entangled state chosen from the set of
two–colorable graph states, specified by the graph G and the
(basis) index µ, with chosen fidelity F = 1 − ǫ. The state
is delivered by the local agents Aj to the end–users Ej . The
company guarantees as a special security service that the local
agents, a potential eavesdropper, or any other party different
than the one who placed the order cannot learn any informa-
tion about the chosen state.
III. SECRET STATE DISTRIBUTION: POSSIBLE
SOLUTIONS
We remark that in the case of noiseless quantum channels
betweenC and the local agents, the described task can be triv-
ially achieved by creating locally at C a single copy of the re-
quested state and distributing it to the local agents. The single
copy does not allow the local agents and a potential eaves-
dropper to learn information about the graph G, even if they
decide to cooperate and perform measurements. This follows
from the fact that the basis index µ is unknown and random
from the point of view of the local agents, which implies that
for any chosen graph G the ensemble of states {|µ〉G} forms
the identity and ensembles corresponding to different graphs
G are hence indistinguishable. However, if (as in a realistic
scenario) the quantum channels connecting the central station
C with the local agents Aj are noisy, the task becomes non–
trivial. In this case, the state obtained by the local agents ρA
will be mixed and the fidelity will be below the desired one.
Realistic applications must be designed to cope with two
sources of errors, namely noisy channels and noisy local oper-
ations. It is well known that problems arising from the noisy
channels can be overcome using entanglement purification.
In a multi-partite scenario we will thus opt for one of the fol-
lowing approaches depending on the particular conditions (see
Fig. 2):
(i) Channel purification (see Sec. III A): The channels it-
self may be purified. This can be accomplished by send-
ing parts of maximally entangled singlet states through
each individual channel fromC toAj and creating from
the resulting multiple copies of the noisy bipartite en-
tangled states a few copies with high fidelity by a se-
quence of local operations and classical communica-
tion (LOCC), e.g. using one of the entanglement pu-
rification protocols of Refs. [4, 5]. This high–fidelity
entangled states can then be used for teleportation [11]
and serve as a purified channel, thereby allowing for the
distribution of arbitrary multipartite entangled states.
(ii) Direct multiparty entanglement purification (see Sec.
III B): The resulting multipartite mixed states ρA can
be purified. That is, several copies of the multipartite
3mixed states ρA are produced by distributing the locally
created graph state through noisy channels to the local
agents Aj . A suitable sequence of LOCC, e.g. the pu-
rification protocol for two–colorable graph states intro-
duced in Ref. [8], allows us to create few copies with
(arbitrary) high fidelity.
(iii) Purification of enlarged states (see Sec. III C): One can
purify an enlarged entangled state, i.e. a (graph) state
that is entangled with additional particles that are kept
at the central station, while the remaining particles are
sent through the noisy channels. The resulting mixed
state ρAC is purified by means of direct multipartite en-
tanglement purification as in (ii), and the desired state
shared among the partiesAj can be created from the pu-
rified state (ideally given by |ΨAC〉) by means of local
measurements in C.
(a) (c)(b)
C CC
A1
A2
A3 A1
A2
A3A1
A2
A3
FIG. 2: Set–up for secure distribution of multipartite entangled states
based on (a) Channel purification (i); (b) direct purification of mul-
tipartite entangled states (ii); (c) purification of enlarged entangled
states (iii).
On top of the noise from channels, there is also noise in
the local control operations. In this case, it turns out that en-
tanglement purification is still possible, although the minimal
required fidelity Fmin (i.e. the maximal acceptable channel
noise) as well as the maximal reachable fidelity Fmax of the
purified states is limited by the amount of noise in the local
control operations [8, 9, 12] and in fact strongly depends on
the entanglement purification protocol that is used. It was
shown in Ref. [9] that direct multipartite entanglement pu-
rification offers advantages over protocols based on bipartite
purification. In particular, for graph states of small degree
and a generic noise model for local operations, the reach-
able fidelity for multipartite states created by bipartite entan-
glement purification (i.e. channel purification) and telepor-
tation turns out to be smaller than the fidelity of the states
created by direct multipartite entanglement purification, i.e.
F
(ii)
max > F
(iii)
max > F
(i)
max. This is true for all values of the local
noise (see Fig. 7 in [9]). The upper fixed points Fmax only
depend on noise in local control operations and on the entan-
glement purification protocol. On the other hand, the mini-
mal required fidelity Fmin (which again depends on the pu-
rification protocol and noise in local control operations) puts
limits on the maximal acceptable channel noise. The mini-
mal required fidelity Fmin fulfills for uncorrelated channels
F
(i)
min < F
(iii)
min < F
(ii)
min, while in the case of correlated chan-
nels the situation can also be the other way around. In general,
each of the three schemes (i-iii) has its own advantages. There
are parameter regimes (noise level of local operations, channel
noise) for which a certain scheme allows one to create an en-
tangled state with sufficiently high fidelity, while the other two
schemes fail. In particular, it can happen that a multipartite
state cannot be produced with required fidelity F = 1 − ǫ as
requested by customers when using method (i), while a proto-
col based on direct multipartite entanglement purification (ii)
or (iii) enables one to reach the required fidelity. These facts
are our main motivation to provide alternative methods to (i)
to accomplish the secret creation of a multipartite entangled
state, that are based on direct multiparty entanglement purifi-
cation.
A. Channel purification
For perfect local control operations, approach (i) immedi-
ately leads to a protocol to create arbitrary multipartite entan-
gled states with high fidelity in such a way that local agents
and possible eavesdroppers do not learn any information about
the created state. The purification of the channel does not
contain any information about the state, and the presence of
eavesdroppers can be excluded by checking the resulting sin-
glet states (e.g. by testing violation of Bell’s inequality or,
simpler, by measuring the expectation values of the correla-
tion operators 〈Kj〉, j = 1, . . . , N ) [13]. After successful
teleportation the local agents only possess a single copy of
an unknown state in a random basis. Again, as in the case
of noiseless channels, the ensembles corresponding to differ-
ent graphs G are indistinguishable. The teleportation process
may even be postponed until the local agents deliver (several
copies of) the purified singlets to the end–users (who may then
check themselves the validity of the singlets together with C
by testing a random subset) before teleporting the requested
multipartite state. This circumvents any possible attempts of
the local agents or eavesdroppers to learn information about
the state or to corrupt the delivered state at a later stage. Secu-
rity requirements are fulfilled even in the presence of imper-
fect control operations, as no information regarding the finally
distributed state can be learned.
B. Direct multipartite entanglement purification
We now turn to the second scenario (ii), the direct purifi-
cation of noisy multipartite entangled states, namely two–
colorable graph states. For simplicity of the analysis, we con-
sider in the following noiseless local operations. This restric-
tion is, however, not crucial and will in fact be dropped later
on. We start by summarizing the main steps involved in any
multipartite purification protocol [8, 9]: (i) Depolarization of
the mixed state ρ to standard form ρG diagonal in the basis
of entangled states to be purified; (ii) Local operations on two
(or more) copies of the state ρG in such a way that informa-
tion about the first state(s) is transferred to the last one; (iii)
4Measurement of the last state to retrieve this information, pub-
lic announcement of the measurement outcomes, and keeping
or discarding the remaining states depending on the measure-
ment outcomes.
It is easy to see that information about the state |µ〉G to be
purified, both about the graph G and the used basis µ, can be
learned in various ways by all local agents involved in such a
protocol. In the depolarization process (i), elements of the sta-
bilizer of |µ〉G (all possible products of correlation operators
KGj ) are applied [3, 8, 9], which reveal information about the
graph G. The local operations and measurements performed
in the second step provide knowledge about the structure of
the graph. For example, in the recurrence protocol of Ref.
[8] the two–coloring of the graph is revealed. The informa-
tion about the measurement outcomes together with the fact
that a particular outcome is interpreted as a successful step
also allows the parties to obtain information about the graph.
The statistics of measurement outcomes in several steps of the
protocol can be used to learn both G and µ, as for all possible
graphs the expectation values of KGj can be calculated and
the corresponding histograms can be analyzed. Finally, since
in principle a large number of copies of the state are avail-
able, (some of) the local agents can decide to perform state
tomography on a sub–ensemble, thereby learning all informa-
tion about the state they should purify. That is, when using any
(known) direct multiparticle entanglement purification proto-
col, the secrecy of the state to be purified is not guaranteed.
1. Blind purification
In the following we will present a modified multipartite en-
tanglement purification protocol where it is impossible for all
involved local agents to learn any information about the state
being purified, even if all of them decide to collaborate and
even if they conspire with a possible eavesdropper who is in
full control of all quantum channels between C and Aj . The
central station C coordinates the action of the local agents
and is the only party (besides the customer that placed the or-
der) that knows the graph state which is being purified. The
customers’ order consists in the graph G and the desired ba-
sis index µ, as well as an additional secret random bit string
of suitable size [14]. After receiving the order, the central
party prepares M two–colorable graph states corresponding
to the graphG and chooses the basis indices |mi〉G randomly
from a uniform distribution. For any graph G the set of graph
states is complete, i.e.
∑
m |m〉G〈m| = 1l. This implies
that the completely mixed ensemble of states corresponding
to two different graphs G1 and G2, {|mi〉G1}i=1,2...,M and
{|mi〉G2}i=1,2...,M , are indistinguishable, as the correspond-
ing density operator (i.e. the proper description of the ensem-
ble for any observer not possessing the information aboutmi)
is the completely mixed state (∝1l) [15]. The states |mi〉 are
then distributed through noisy channels to the local agentsAj .
Purification of these states takes place by a protocol (see be-
low) where no information about the indicesmi or the graph
G is revealed, which ensures that at any stage of the proto-
col the ensemble of states corresponding to different graphs
remain indistinguishable by the local agents. Finally the state
|µ〉G is delivered to the end–users.
The first step in the purification protocol is to ensure that
the mixed state ρ — which arises after sending the state |m〉G
through the noisy channels E1, E2, . . . , EN— is diagonal in
the specific graph state basis {|n〉G}. In standard purifica-
tion protocols this is enforced by depolarizing the transmit-
ted state. Instead, here we depolarize the channels Ej to a
Pauli–diagonal form [16]. This can be accomplished by ap-
plying probabilistically the operators σi [σTi ] before [after]
sending a particle through the channel in a correlated way
(here {σi}i=0,...,3 = {1l, σx, σy, σz}). Given a general ini-
tial channel Eρ = ∑3i,j=0 λijσiρσj the resulting depolarized
channel E˜ is then given by E˜ρ = ∑3j=0 λjjσjρσj . More-
over, the action of a Pauli operator in party Ak on a graph
state results in another graph state: σ(Ak)i |m〉G〈m|σ(Ak)i =
|m ⊕ nGi 〉G〈m⊕ nGi |, where nGi depends on the neigh-
borhood of particle Ak specified by the graph G [9]. That
is, sending |m〉G through the depolarized channels also re-
sults —independently of the graph G— in the creation of a
graph–diagonal state in this specific graph state basis [17].
Additionally, by writing |m〉G = σmAz σmBx |0〉G —where
m = (mA,mB) and σmAi denotes the action of σi on all
parties j ∈ A for which mj = 1, we find that if
ρ0 = E1 . . . EN |0〉G〈0| =
∑
n
λn|n〉G〈n|, (2)
is the state resulting from sending |0〉G through the channels,
then the resulting state ρm when sending a different basis state
|m〉G, is given by a simple basis shift of ρ0, i.e.
ρm = E1 . . . EN |m〉G〈m| =
∑
n
λn|n⊕m〉G〈n⊕m|. (3)
These are non–trivial properties of states diagonal in a graph
state basis that follow from the description of these states in
terms of their stabilizers and from the commutation relations
of the Pauli matrices. At this stage the local agents Aj thus
share the M states {ρmi}i=1,...,M [18].
We now introduce modified multipartite recurrence proto-
cols P1′, P2′ that give the same performance as the protocols
P1, P2 of Ref. [8, 9], but operate on states ρm, ρn (which are
obtained by a basis shift from ρ0 according to Eq. 3) and fulfill
our security requirements. We start with protocol P1′, where
in a first step local CNOT operations [19] with the particles
of the first [second] state acting as source [target] respectively
are applied by all parties. It is easy to check that the action of
such multilateral CNOT operations is given by
|mA,mB〉|nA,nB〉 → |mA,mB ⊕ nB〉|mA ⊕ nA,nB〉.(4)
All particles of the second state are then measured in the
eigenbasis {|0〉x, |1〉x} of σx, yielding results (−1)ξi which
are publicly announced. From ξi the expectation values of all
correlation operators Kj with j ∈ A can be calculated at the
central station C. The result is taken as a successful purifi-
cation step if the calculated expectation values correspond to
5mA ⊕ nA. In this case, one finds that the resulting state is
again diagonal in the graph state basis, with new coefficients
λ˜γA⊕mA,γB⊕mB⊕nB =
1
2K
∑
{(νB,µB)|νB⊕µB=γB}
λγA,νBλγA,µB , (5)
where K is a normalization constant. Note that these coeffi-
cients are exactly the same as in the situation where we apply
the original protocol P1 to two copies of ρ0, only the ba-
sis of the resulting state is shifted by (mA,mB ⊕ nB) (as
done in Eq. 3). Similarly, the protocol P2′ consists of local
CNOTs in the opposite direction, followed by measurement of
all particles of the second state in the eigenbasis {|0〉z, |1〉z}
of σz . From the measurement outcomes the expectation val-
ues of all correlation operators Kj , j ∈ B can be calculated
at the central station C. The result is interpreted as a suc-
cessful step if the calculated expectation values correspond
to mB ⊕ nB . Again, one can determine the action of this
protocol on two states ρm ⊗ ρn and finds that the resulting
state is up to a basis shift (mA ⊕ nA,mB) the same as the
one obtained by the protocol P2 applied to ρ⊗2
0
. The pu-
rification procedure takes place by an alternating application
of protocols P1′, P2′, where at each step the central station
randomly chooses the pairs to combine. In particular, also
pairs resulting from unsuccessful purification rounds are fur-
ther processed. We remark that this substantially reduces the
yield of the entanglement purification protocol as compared to
the original scheme. The reachable fidelity and error thresh-
olds, however, are exactly the same as of protocols P1, P2
investigated in Ref. [8, 9]. The only difference to the original
scheme for the central partyC is that it has to keep track of the
basis shift for each state and modify the decision about suc-
cessful/unsuccessful purification steps (which are not publicly
announced) accordingly. We remark that in order to deter-
mine the basis shifts for final copies, knowledge of the initial
basis shifts {mi} and the history of the purification proce-
dure is required for each state, i.e. ni = fi(mi). At the end
of the procedure, additional independent random basis shifts
are applied to all states (this can be accomplished by letting
the local agents apply appropriate Pauli operators), where for
a specific copy, say 1, resulting from a successful purifica-
tion branch (i.e. all purification steps successful) a basis shift
n1 ⊕ µ is performed. This guarantees that copy 1 is in the
basis µ and hence corresponds to the required state. The or-
der of the copies is randomly chosen by C in such a way that
copy 1 is located at position specified by the additional se-
cret bit string which is shared with the end–users. All states
(also the ones resulting from unsuccessful purification steps)
are then handed over to the end–users. This ensures that it re-
mains unknown to all involved parties (except C and the end–
users) which of the copies correspond to successful branches.
Finally, all states but copy 1 are measured, either in the eigen-
basis of σx or σz and the measurement results are publicly
announced. This allows the central station to check the trust-
fulness of the local agents, as e.g. for states corresponding to
a successful purification procedure the expectation values of
the correlation operatorsKGj and hence the fidelity of the pro-
duced states can be determined by C [13]. Depending on the
results of this verification procedure, C uses another shared
random bit to secretly announce whether the remaining copy
can be used for the desired security application. We note that
distrustful local agents or eavesdropper can always prevent a
successful generation of the desired state, e.g. by simply not
taking place in the purification procedure as requested or by
adding additional noise. However, if the state passed the veri-
fication procedure it can be guaranteed that it has the required
fidelity and that the local agents have not learned information
about the target state.
2. Security of direct multiparty entanglement purification
We now discuss the security of this modified protocol by
analyzing the scheme from the point of view of the local
agents (or eavesdropper). We first remark that the entangle-
ment purification protocol is carefully constructed in such a
way that absolutely no information about the state to be puri-
fied is revealed during the protocol. In contrast to original pro-
tocols P1, P2, the protocols are symmetric, i.e. no informa-
tion about the two–coloring of the graph is revealed. The ran-
domly chosen basis states {mi} guarantees that at any stage
of the protocol no information about the structure of the graph
can be learned from measurement statistics, as any statistics
is randomized due to random basis shifts. Even the informa-
tion of whether a given purification step is successful or not is
kept secret. This is guaranteed on the one hand by randomly
combining copies of the state after each purification round and
on the other hand by delivering the whole ensemble of states
rather than a single copy (which the local agents would oth-
erwise identify as the resulting state of several successful pu-
rification rounds). Although it seems unlikely that such a tiny
amount of information could be used by the local agents and
eavesdropper to learn about the identity of the graph state, it
can not be excluded that there exists a strategy which allows
them to make use of this information. One may e.g. imag-
ine that by means of a graph state analyzer they were able to
learn information about the basis index mi for this specific
state, which —together with the information that the state re-
sults from several successful purification rounds— could then
be used to exclude the graphs that are incompatible with the
measurement outcomes obtained in the purification protocol.
Hence, we have modified the purification protocol in the way
described above, which guarantees that no additional infor-
mation can be learned from the protocol itself. In fact, from
the point of view of the local agents the protocol they should
perform (as well as all measurement outcomes etc.) is the
same for all graph states. It follows that the secrecy of the
graph state to be purified is still guaranteed by the fact that
the corresponding ensembles of states for two different graph
states are indistinguishable, as they are both described by the
identity. Naturally, this still holds if one considers the trans-
mitted ensemble of states {ρmi} instead of {mi}: it is safe
to attribute the noise in the channel to the actions of an eaves-
dropper and/or the agents.
We finally remark that unconditional security can only be
6guaranteed if we keep the information whether the required
state has been successfully created or not secret. Otherwise
there exists an (indirect) strategy for a possible eavesdropper
to learn about the graph: by varying the noise in the channel
(we assume that Eve has complete control over the channel),
Eve together with the local agents can prevent the purifica-
tion of certain states (e.g. states with high degree) as for these
states the channel noise (or noise in local control operations)
is above the threshold value where purification is possible. As
the threshold values depend on the graph, knowing whether
the purification procedure was successful or not, would pro-
vide Eve with some information about the graph, e.g. about
its (local) degree. This is just a single bit of information which
might well be negligible in many cases as there exist exponen-
tially many different graph states which are potential target
states. By keeping the information of whether the procedure
was successful or not secret, we prevent Eve from learning
even this single bit of information. The validation stage in our
protocol only serves to detect possible attempts of the local
agents to prevent the production of the state with required fi-
delity. The secrecy of the states is guaranteed by other means
(the random basis shifts). In principle, one may use the val-
idation stage also to detect possible attempts of Eve or the
local agents to gain information about the final graph, which
clearly leads to corruption of the states and hence to reduced
fidelity. In approach (iii) we will discuss a strategy which
guarantees security even when the success or failure of the
protocol is publicly known. The strategy of (iii) can immedi-
ately be adopted to the protocol described above.
The influence of noisy local operations can easily be ana-
lyzed. From the point of view of the central station C, we
essentially have entanglement purification protocols P1, P2
with imperfect means with the corresponding properties dis-
cussed in Refs. [8, 9]. In particular, entanglement purification
is still possible even for errors of local operations at the order
of (several) percent. Only the the reachable fidelity of the tar-
get state is limited. From the point of view of the local agents,
the additional noise in their operations will not enable them
to learn more information about the state to be purified than
they would be able to learn if their operations are noiseless
(they still would have to distinguish between two ensembles
of states which are both —from their point of view— the iden-
tity at all stages of the protocol). Thus the produced state re-
mains secret and the required procedure can be followed in a
real–world scenario. The secrecy of the states at all stages is
guaranteed by the random basis shifts {mi}, which on the one
hand ensure that the input ensemble is the maximally mixed
state, and on the other hand that measurement statistics and
any association of specific outcomes with the graph–structure
during the protocol itself are randomized. The second state-
ment follows from the non–trivial property of two–colorable
graph states that basis shifts can be effectively propagated
through both the channels and the purification protocols, re-
sulting in output states with shifted bases.
C. Purification of enlarged states
We now turn to scenarion (iii), the purification of enlarged
states. Instead of creating the desired graph state |µ〉G directly
and sending several copies through the noisy channels to the
local agents, the central station can also create enlarged graph
states |0〉G˜ of 2N qubits in such a way that each vertex of the
initial graph is connected to an additional, independent vertex.
That is, if G = (V,E) is the graph of vertices {1, 2, . . . , N},
then the graph G˜ corresponding to the enlarged state is given
by vertices {1, 2, . . . , 2N} with edges E˜ = E ∪{(k, k+N)}
with k = 1, 2, . . . , N . The qubits corresponding to vertices 1
to N are sent through the noisy channels to the local agents,
while qubitsN+1 to 2N are kept by the central partyC. The
bases randomization of initial states done in approach (ii) is
here replaced by additional quantum correlations between C
and Aj . In principle, C could introduce random basis shifts
on the states of Aj by performing suitable measurements (re-
ducing the protocol to the one discussed in (ii)). However, the
quantum correlations are more powerful than classical corre-
lations, which allows us to further simplify the purification
protocol. The purification takes place by a multipartite pro-
tocol and hence offers advantages (e.g. higher reachable fi-
delity) as compared to scheme (i) based on channel purifica-
tion. When compared to scheme (ii), one finds a higher ro-
bustness of the states against channel noise for uncorrelated
channels. It is easy to check that the state |0〉G˜ can be written
as
|0〉G˜ =
1√
2N
∑
m
|m〉G ⊗ |m〉, (6)
where |m〉G is a graph state corresponding to graph G of par-
ticles 1 to N , while |m〉 = |m1m2 . . .mN 〉 with mj ∈ {0, 1}
are orthogonal product states of particles N + 1 to 2N and
the sum runs over all possible binary vectorsm. We have that
|mk〉 denotes the eigenstate with eigenvalue (−1)mk of the
operator σz if k ∈ A [σx if k ∈ B], where A,B correspond to
the two–coloring of the graph G˜.
The resulting noisy graph states are then purified using
multipartite entanglement purification protocols P1′, P2′ de-
scribed above, which can be applied because the graph G˜ is
two–colorable whenever the initial graph G is two–colorable.
While the local agents publicly announce their measurement
outcomes, the central party C keeps its measurement out-
comes secret. The expectation value of each correlation op-
erator Kj —which determine whether a purification step is
successful or not— depends on the measurement outcome in
particle j and its neighbors. For j > N , particle j itself is held
byC, while for j < N the neighboring particle (j+N) is held
by C, which implies that the expectation value of Kj ∀j can
not be determined by the local agents. The additional qubits
held at C act as randomizer for all measurement outcomes of
the local agents. After several successful purification rounds
(where in this case always two pairs resulting from a success-
ful purification round can be combined), all but a single copy
is measured in eigenbasis of σx or σz , where again only the
measurement outcomes of local agents are announced. From
7the measurement outcomes, C can calculate expectation val-
ues for the correlation operatorsKj and hence verify whether
the required fidelity of the states was achieved. If the states
passed the validation step, i.e. the required fidelity is achieved,
the local agents hand the particles of the remaining copy over
to the end–users. Finally, all qubits in C of the remaining
copy are measured in the eigenbasis of σz [σx] if they are in
A [B], where A,B corresponds to the two–coloring of the
graph G˜. If the final states were pure, i.e. |0〉G˜, it follows
from Eq. 6 that for measurement outcome corresponding to
m = m1m2 . . .mN with mj ∈ {0, 1}, the resulting state
shared by the end users would be given by |m〉G. Announc-
ing publicly the bit stringm⊕µ allows the end–users to shift
the basis such that they finally hold the state |µ〉G. Note that
m⊕ µ is a random string from the point of view of local
agents and an eavesdropper, and does not contain informa-
tion since µ is secret. We consider now the case where the
final state is mixed, i.e. ρG˜ =
∑
µν λµν |µν〉G˜〈µν|, where
µ corresponds to vertices 1 to N (i.e. the particles held by
the local agents), while ν refers to vertices N + 1 to 2N (i.e.
the particles held by C). In the case where the outcome of
all measurements is (+1), we have that the state after the mea-
surements in C is given by
ρ0 =
∑
µ
(
∑
ν
λµν)|µ〉G〈µ|, (7)
while for other measurement outcomesm the basis is shifted
bym, i.e. we obtain ρm. Note that the fidelity G〈m|ρm|m〉G
with respect to the graph state corresponding to the graph G
is larger than the fidelity of the initial (enlarged) state with
respect to the graph state |00〉G˜ which is given by λ00.
1. Secturity of purification of enlarged states
We now discuss the security of this protocol. We have that
the reduced density operator of particles 1 to N held by the
local agents (or an eavesdropper) is given by ∑m |m〉G〈m|
which is the identity for any graph G. This implies that even
if several copies of the state are available to the local agents,
they are not able to distinguish between different graphs. In
fact, the state |0〉G˜ (Eq. 6) is maximally entangled between
systems C and the local agents. This implies that by an ap-
propriate unitary operation in C, one can change the sub–
graph G in A to any other sub–graph G′. This can be seen
from the fact that for a maximally entangled state |Φ〉CA,
UTC ⊗ 1lA|Φ〉 = 1lA ⊗ UA|Φ〉. In other words, C has in prin-
ciple the freedom to change the delivered state until the last
moment i.e. after the last copy is delivered to the end–users,
which clearly makes it impossible for the local agents or any
eavesdropper to determine the state. For these states it is also
irrelevant whether the local agents learn if the final state is
the result of several successful purification rounds. While in
the purification of the initial graph state |0〉G, this information
(together with the knowledge of basis) would have allowed the
local agents to exclude certain graphs (as they are not compat-
ible with the values for correlation operators KGj calculated
from the measurement outcomes), here the value of each cor-
relation operator KG˜j depends on the unknown, random mea-
surement outcome of a qubit in C and hence is unknown (and
completely random) from the point of view of the local agents
or eavesdropper. Hence, one can in this case deliver only a
single copy of the state to the end–users (thereby revealing
that this copy is the result of several successful purification
rounds) as well as only combine copies resulting from a pre-
vious successful purification step without compromising se-
curity of the protocol.
The only possibility left to the eavesdropper to gain infor-
mation about the graph is the indirect attack outlined in de-
scription of protocol (ii), Sec. III B. That is, Eve may ad-
just the noise in channels and local operations in such a way
that only certain states can be purified (group 1), while oth-
ers can not (group 2). From the fact whether the purification
protocol was successful or not, one bit of information about
the graph could be obtained in this way (namely whether the
graph belongs to group 1 or 2). However, this approach nec-
essarily forces Eve to modify channel noise and/or noise in
local control operations, which can be detected by the central
partyC. To this aim,C uses an enhanced validation procedure
which in this case serves not only to guarantee the fidelity of
the states to be purified, but is aimed to detect any possible
attempts of the eavesdropper to modify the noise processes.
This can be done e.g. by sending parts of maximally entan-
gled states as probe states at certain instances instead of mul-
tipartite states to be purified (the position of these probe states
remains unknown to eavesdropper). Measurements of observ-
ables σx and σz —which occur naturally in the purification
protocol— can be used to perform channel tomography (at
early instances of the protocol) and process tomography (at
later stages of the protocol) and hence to detect any attempts
of the eavesdropper to increase noise. Note that it is sufficient
to send parts of maximally entangled state through channels to
perform complete channel tomography [20]. Measurements
of the two observables are sufficient in this case, as additional
basis changes (and hence effective measurements of other ob-
servables) can be enforced by C at the local agents during
the initial channel depolarization. Local agents can in this
case not distinguish whether the requested unitary operations
corresponds to channel depolarization procedure or to a real
basis change. The procedure is aborted if anything is not as
expected (i.e. additional noise in channels or local operations
occurred), even if the purification of |0〉G˜ was successful.
Alternatively (or additionally), C may prepare and purify
not only the enlarged graph state |0〉G˜, but also several copies
of other graph states |0〉G˜′ corresponding to different graphs
G˜′ (with different threshold values). The positions of these
states are randomly chosen. In the validation step C checks if
the purification of these probe states was successful. This al-
lowsC to draw conclusions about attempts of Eve to introduce
additional noise and eventually to abort the procedure. We re-
mark that one typically has a hierarchy of states with respect
to their fragility to noise. That is, if the purification of a cer-
tain state was successful, one can conclude that also several
other states (corresponding to different graphs) are purifica-
ble. In particular, C can be sure that Eve cannot distinguish
8between the graph G and any graph G˜′ for which purification
succeeded. We remark that the same procedure can also be
used in the context of protocol (ii).
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The purified states, created by one of the procedures (i),
(ii), (iii) serve as a resource for a variety of (security) tasks.
Graph states are for instance an algorithmic specific resource,
i.e. depending on which state is produced a different quan-
tum algorithm can be applied by a simple sequence of local
measurements [2]. Other possible applications include se-
cure evaluation of a (secret) function, secret sharing among
some of the parties and multipartite voting schemes. The tasks
that can be performed strongly depend on the structure of the
graph state being produced, and thus remain unknown to any
outsider party.
We have introduced the distribution of an unknown multi-
partite entangled state with high fidelity as a basic quantum
primitive, which can be accomplished in a real–world sce-
nario where quantum channels as well as local control oper-
ations are noisy. We have presented three alternative ways to
achieve this aim, based on channel purification and teleporta-
tion or direct multipartite entanglement purification, respec-
tively. While the first approach is conceptually simpler, the
second and third offer advantages with respect to reachable
fidelities and tolerable errors.
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